Currently, smart card based remote user authentication schemes have been widely adopted due to their low cost and convenient portability. With the purpose of using various different internet services with single registration and to protect the users from being tracked, various dynamic ID based multi-server authentication protocols have been proposed. Recently, Li et al. proposed an efficient and secure dynamic ID based authentication protocol using smart cards. They claimed that their protocol provides strong security. In this paper, we have demonstrated that Li et al.'s protocol is vulnerable to replay attack, denial of service attack, smart card lost attack, eavesdropping attack and server spoofing attacks.
Introduction
With the rapid growth of internet technologies and mobile communication services, remote user authentication is being more and more critical in order to prevent access to illegal users. Password based authentication is one of the simplest and the most convenient authentication mechanisms over remote access networks but it is not secure over insecure communication channels. Hence a large number of smart card based authentication protocols have been proposed to overcome the drawbacks of traditional password based protocols. These can be categorized as static ID [1] [2] [3] and dynamic ID based protocols. To achieve user's anonymity, dynamic ID based authentication techniques [4] [5] [6] have been developed by many researchers.
In general, an efficient remote user authentication protocol should satisfy some functional and security requirements [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] . Based on the use of environment, authentications protocols can be divided into two categories: single-server and multi-server environments. Multi server architecture [12] [13] [14] [15] provides the flexibility of using single registration across various different networks.
In 2009, Liao and Wang [16] proposed a dynamic ID based authentication protocol for multi-server environ-ments. Hsiang and Shih [17] found that Liao-Wang's protocol is vulnerable to insider's attack, masquerade attack, server spoofing attack, registration center spoofing attack. To overcome these weaknesses Hsiang and Shih proposed an improved protocol. But Lee et al. [18] found that this protocol is also not secure and susceptible to masquerade attack and server spoofing attack. 
Review of Li et al.'s Protocol
The notations used in this paper are described in Table 1 .
Li et al.'s protocol contains three participants, the user U i , the server S j , and the registration center RC. RC chooses the master secret key x and a secret number y to compute h(x||y) and h(SID j ||h(y)), and then shares them with S j via a secure channel. There are four phases in the protocol: registration phase, login phase, verification phase, and password change phase.
Registration Phase
When the user U i wants to access the services, the user U i and the registration center RC need to perform the following steps to finish the registration phase:
1) U i freely chooses his identity ID i , the password PW i , and computes A i = h(b ⊕ PW i ), where b is a random number generated by U i . Then U i sends ID and A i to the registration center RC for registration through a secure channel.
2) Now, Registration center, RC computes B i = h(ID i ||x), C i = h(ID i ||h(y)||A i ), D i = h(B i ||h(x||y)), E i = B i ⊕ h(x||y). RC stores {C i , D i , E i , h(.), h(y)} on the user's smart card and sends it to user U i via a secure channel.
3) User keys b into smart card and finally it contains {C i , D i , E i , b, h(.), h(y)}.
Login Phase
Whenever U i wants to login S j , he must perform the following steps to generate a login request message: 
, and checks whether the computed C i * is equal to C i . If they are equal, U i proceed the following steps. Otherwise the smart card aborts the session.
2) The smart card generates a random number N i and computes
3) U i submits {P ij , CID i , M 1 , M 2 } to S j as a login request message.
Verification Phase
After S j receiving the login message {P ij , CID i , M 1 , M 2 }, S j and U i perform the following steps for mutual authentication and session key agreement. 1) S j computes N i = M 2 ⊕ h(SID j ||h(y)), E i = P ij ⊕ h(h(SID j ||h(y))||N i ), B i = E i ⊕ h(x||y), D i = h(B i ||h(x||y)) and A i = CID i ⊕ h(D i ||SID j ||N i ) by using {P ij , CID i , M 1 , M 2 }, h(SID j ||h(y)) and h(x||y).
2) S j computes h(P ij ∥CID i ∥D i ∥N i ) and checks whether it is equal to M 1 . If they are not equal, S j rejects the login request and terminates this session. Otherwise, S j accepts the login request message. Then S j generates a nonce N j and computes 
Password Change Phase
This phase is invoked whenever U i wants to change his password PW i to a new password PW new . There is no need for a secure channel for password change and it can be finished without communicating with the registration center RC.
1) U i inserts smart card into the card reader and inputs ID i and PW i .
2) The smart card computes A i = h(b ⊕ PW i ), C i * = h(ID i ||h(y)||A i ), and checks whether the computed C i * is equal to C i . If they are not equal, the smart card rejects the password change request. Otherwise, the user U i inputs a new password PW new and a new random number b new .
3) The smart card computes A inew = h(b new ⊕ PW new ) and C inew = h(ID i ||h(y)||A inew ). 4) Finally, the smart card replaces C i with C inew to finish the password change phase.
Cryptanalysis of Li et al.'s Protocol
In this section, we demonstrate that Li et al.'s protocol is vulnerable to replay attack, denial of service attack, smart card lost attack, eavesdropping attack and server spoofing attacks.
Vulnerable to Replay Attack
Assume that a malicious attacker can eavesdrop the communication channel and intercepts the message {P ij , CID i , M 1 , M 2 }.Now if he resends this message, server S does not verify the freshness of nonce, N i and computes N i = h(SID j ||h(y)) ⊕ M 2 , E i = P ij ⊕ h(h(SID j ||h(y)||N i ), B i = E i ⊕ h(x||y), D i = h(B i ||h(x||y)) and h(P ij ||CID i ||D i ||N i ) and compares with M 1 . The condition satisfies and S accepts the login request. Now, S computes M 3 = h(D i ||A i ||N j ||SID j ), M 4 = A i ⊕ N i ⊕ N j and sends {M 3 , M 4 } to U i . Here the attacker cannot find N j but he is successful in wasting server's valuable computing resources. A large number of replay attacks launched at the same time can also form denial-of-service attack.
Vulnerable to Denial-of-Service Attack
n active attacker who is also a valid user knowing h(y) can fabricate the message M 2 using different nonce, say N A and sends the fabricated message {P ij , CID i , M 1 , M 2 } to server, S j where M 2 = h(SID j ||h(y)) ⊕ N A . After performing the steps mentioned in 2.3.1, server S j rejects the login request of U i , who is a legitimate user, as h(P ij ||CID i ||D i ||N i ) does not equal to the received M 1 . Hence, denial-of-service attack is possible.
Vulnerable to Smart Card Lost Attack and Password Guessing Attack
Assume that the user's smart card has been lost or stolen. The attacker can extract the information C i, D i, E i , h(.), h(y), b from the smart card [20, 21] . By previously intercepted message, attacker can find N i , E i using the following calculations.
Using offline dictionary attack, attacker can find the ID, password PW of U i by performing following operations:
1) Compare C i with h(ID guess ||h(y)||A i ). Whenever it equals, ID guess is ID i of the user U i.
2) Compare A i with h(b ⊕ PW guess ).Whenever it equals, PW guess is the original PW of U i.
As the ID and Password are known, attacker can use the smart card impersonating the original user.
Vulnerable to Eavesdropping Attack
Assume that attacker found the smart card details. . Hence, the entire communication is compromised using this passive attack as the attacker has known the session key.
Vulnerable to Server Spoofing Attack
If we assume the attacker, A broke into a server or acquired a malicious server, then attacker have h(x||y) and h(SID j ||h(y)). Attacker, A can masquerade as server, S j to spoof user, U i . 
Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that Li et al.'s dynamic ID based authentication protocol cannot resist many attacks and is vulnerable to replay attack, denial of service attack, smart card lost attack, eavesdropping attack and server spoofing attacks. We strongly feel that a remote user authentication protocol should provide security against the above mentioned attacks so that it can be used in the real world applications.
